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THE PLIGHT OF A STRIKE BOUND CARRIER
By CaALEs H. WOODS*
T iREE times within the past five years, the rail carriers have
been faced with a nation wide strike of their employees. On
two of these occasions the government seized the roads. In one
way or another disaster was avoided, the disputes were settled,
the men agreed to go back to work; the roads were returned to
their private owners. Whatever may be said about the power of
the President, acting as Commander-m-Chief in war time, to take
over the railroads for the purpose of stopping a strike, the power
of the government in peace time to do so, is open to question.'
The Railroad Labor Act - proved to be a preventive of serious
trouble from its passage in 1926, down to 1936. Since that time
its weaknesses, under existing conditions, have been fully dis-
closed. The plight of the public in the face of a nation wide rail-
road strike is self-evident. The plight of the carriers in the face
of such a strike is perhaps not quite so well understood.
While these three great threats to our national safety have
filled the columns of the press, have attracted the public's attention,
and been the subject of much debate, in and out of Congress, an-
other type of labor trouble has arisen during the past ten years,
less spectacular, but exceedingly annoying and troublesome to the
carriers and quite burdensome to shippers and their customers.
These are the cases, more or less confined to a particular territory
or city, where, having no labor troubles of their own, carriers find
themselves embroiled and dragged against their will into the labor
troubles of others. To use the picturesque phrase of Justice Frank-
furter,3 the carriers have been, perforce, brought into the arena of
secondary boycotts as "conscripted neutrals."
To illustrate: Because a mail-order house continued to sell
Coca-Cola, the striking employees of the bottling company threw
a secondary boycott picket line around its plant.4 Truckers of the
city were all unionized, their employees refused to cross the
Coca-Cola picket line. This left the mail-order house marooned;
*Lecturer in Law, University of Arizona College of Law, formerly
General Attorney and General Solicitor, the A. T. & S. F Ry.
1. The only existing law is the Army Appropriation Act of 1916. 39
Stat. 619, 645 (1916), 10 U. S. C. § 1361 (1946).
2. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended by 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 49 Stat.
1189 (1936) ; 54 Stat. 785 (1940), 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1946).
3. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 728 (1942).
4. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 42 M. C. C.
212 (1943).
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it entered into a contract with the Railway Express Agency to
perform its pick up and delivery service. The truckers' unions
then had a real grievance, someone had been found to perform
the service which they had refused to do, so, on their own account,
they threw out a picket line across the means of access to the mail-
order house, and demanded that all truckers and their employees
observe it. The contract between the truckers and their employees
called for a closed shop, and provided that the employees would
not be asked to cross a picket line. The truckers observed their
agreement. What would have happened if they had tried some-
thing else? Nobody knows, but that the results which could fol-
low might prove disastrous requires no great imagination to
perceive.5
A hotel gets into a dispute with its cooks. They strike. This
then, involves the maids, the butchers, the mechanics, the grocers,
the laundrymen, and finally the draymen who haul trunks, and
the express carriers who deliver parcels. These secondary boycotts
and sympathetic strikes cause the carriers no end of annoyance,
their patrons a great deal of inconvenience, and in some instances
lead to serious losses, threatened bankruptcy, and possible dep-
rivation of the right to do business. From time to time and in
the particular communities involved, the public may know of these
disturbances, and be affected by loss of transportation facilities.
But here again, just as in the case of a nation wide strike, the
plight of the carriers is not so apparent to the general public.
The purpose of this paper is to point out some of the per-
plexing problems of common carriers confronted with a strike,
and to explain why it is that their efforts to extricate themselves
have proved largely unsuccessful. The subject will be discussed
under the following arrangement
I. In Equity
(a) The carrier as petitioner.
(b) The carrier as respondent.
II. In Law
(a) The carrier as plaintiff seeking to recover damages.
(b) The carrier as defendant in suits brought against it
for damages.
III. Before the Interstate Commerce Commission.






TiaE CARRIER AS PETITIONE
"No more unusual question has ever perplexed the mind of a
Judge," wrote judge Murrah in the North Texas Freight Lines
case.6
Local 886 of the A. F of L. Teamsters' union, having organized
practically all of the highway carriers in the territory, decided to
move in on the plaintiff, North Texas Freight Lines. At the time
only two of plaintiff's employees were members of the Teamsters'
Union. Plaintiff had a valid existing collective bargaining agree-
ment covering all of its employees, which had been negotiated
under procedure prescribed by the Wagner ActJ This made no
difference; the officers of the Local made demand on the plaintiff
for representation and a closed shop. To have complied would
have meant repudiation of its existing contract and subjected it
to prosecution by the National Labor Relations Board for in-
dulging in unfair labor practices. When the plaintiff refused, the
Local ordered a strike, threw a picket line around plaintiff's ware-
house, and proceeded to enforce boycotts against plaintiff's patrons
and interline-connecting carriers. In a short while, plaintiff had
lost sixty per cent of its business.
If Judge Murrah found this a perplexing situation, think how
it appeared to the plaintiff. It was a common carrier under legal
compulsion, both at common law and under federal and state
statutes, to furnish service to patrons and to receive shipments
from connecting carriers. If it failed to provide such service, an
aggrieved shipper or connecting carrier might file a complaint
with the Interstate Commerce Comnmssion8 or with local regulatory
authorities. Should a cease and desist order be issued against it,
and that order be disobeyed, the carrier might forfeit its authority
to do business. Also, it faced the immediate prospect of being
transformed from a useful servant of the people, making money,
into a ward of the bankruptcy court.
When an appeal to the civil authorities, local and state, brought
no relief, the plaintiff went into a federal court and tried to secure
an injunction. Here the Norris-La Guardia Act was invoked as
6. Houston & North Texas Lines v. Local No. 886, 24 F. Supp. 619
(W.D. Okla. 1938).
7. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
8. 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
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a barrier. 9 Was there a labor dispute? Clearly so, under the defini-
tion contained in § 13, the merits of the dispute could not be
tried by the court. Were the strike, picket and boycott legal?
Clearly so, under the definitions of § 4 of this Act, the union was
striving to advance the economic self interest of its members, that
its cause of action might result in damage to the employer and
cause harm to the public and other employees was irrelevant. So,
Judge Murrah closed the door of the equity court, leaving the
carrier petitioner to stand on the very cold outside.
Such questions as these continue to perplex the minds of
jurists, but they are no longer unusual.10 The Court of Appeals
in the Keystone case,"1 said that, while ordinarily the duties of a
common carrier are paramount to private rights, nevertheless the
Motor Carrier Act does not operate to enlarge the jurisdiction of
an equity court beyond the limits imposed on it by the Norris-La
Guardia Act. In the Toledo, Peoria & Western R. R. case, 2 the
Court of Appeals thought that when Congress had imposed cer-
tain duties on a common carrier, it could not have intended that
it should be denied federal relief from those who would prevent
it from carrying out such duties. But the Supreme Court held that
the injunctive relief could be granted only when the prerequisites
and conditions of the Norris-La Guardia Act had been complied
9. 47 Stat. 70 (1932)
10. Southern Motor Lines v. Hoover Truck Co., 34 F Supp. 390 (M.D.
Tenn. 1940), Colorado-Wyoming Express v. Denver Local Union, 35 F
Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1940), International Brotherhood v. International U.,
106 F 2d 871 (C.C.A. 9th 1939), Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone
Freight Lines, 126 F 2d 931 (C.C.A. 10th 1942), reversing 37 F Supp. 635
(W.D. Okla. 1941), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 645 (1942). Note reference to
other unreported cases in Keystone Freight Lines v. Pratt Thomas Truck
Line, 37 F Supp. 635, 643 (W.D. Okla. 1941). State prototypes of the federal
anti-injunction statute have been similarly construed. Schivera v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 296 N. Y. 26, 60 N. E. 2d 233 (1946), Denver Union
v. Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P 2d 436 (1940), Denver Union v.
Buckingham Co., 108 Colo. 419, 118 P 2d 1088 (1941). But see Milk
Products v. Brotherhood, 116 Colo. 389, 183 P 2d 529 (1947).
State statutes patterned after the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914),
were similarly construed. Culinary Union No. 631 v. Busy Bee Cafe, 57
Ariz. 514, 115 P 2d 246 (1941) In jurisdictions where anti-injunction
statutes did not exist, occasional injunctions on behalf of a carrier have
been granted. Burlington Trans. Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Iowa 135, 12 N. W
2d 167 (1943), Northwestern Pac. R. R. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers
Union, 189 P 2d 277 (Cal. 1948), 21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 422, Terminal
R. Ass'n v. International Ass'n, 333 Ill. App. 288, 77 N. E. 2d 448
(1948) , Milk Producers v. Brotherhood, 116 Colo. 389, 183 P 2d 529 (1947) ,
Swenson v. Seattle Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177 P 2d 873 (1947)
11. Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F 2d 931
(C.C.A. 10th 1942)
12. Trainmen v. Toledo, P & W R. R., 321 U. S. 50 (1944), reversing
132 F 2d 265 (C.C.A. 7th 1942).
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with. An effort to carve out an exception in the case of a carrier
under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, likewise failed.1 3
Thus carriers, through no fault of their own, have been im-
paled on the horns of a dilemma. Two opposing principles of
public policy were causing the trouble. One of these demanded
that the carriers serve the public efficiently and without discrimina-
hon. The other required that the laborer be left alone to work out
his own salvation by economic force if necessary, even though this
private warfare should cause harm to others. Neither principle
would yield to the other; and no outside force of power or per-
suasion could be found to resolve the impass6. In such a muddled
state the courts of equity felt impelled to keep hands off. Having
no remedy in equity, the carriers were in a difficult position.'
In the Northwestern Pacfict case, 5 the Supreme Court of
California dearly perceived the irreconcilable nature of the two
conflicting principles, and not being tied down by an anti-injunction
statute, approached the dilemma from the viewpoint of broad pub-
13. Ini re Quick Charge, Inc., 69 F Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1947),
rev'd 168 F. 2d 513 (C.C.A. 10th 1948). It will be interesting to ascertain
what eventually will happen to the injunction recently (Nov. 29th) granted
by Judge George H. Moore, directed against Guy A. Thompson, Trustee
in Bankruptcy of the Missouri Pacific, ordering the railroad to send
its cars across a picket line and to restore service to a stove factory.
14. Removing the handicap of the Norris-La Guardia Act would per-
haps restore the principles applied in the earlier cases. The truth of this is
inferable from United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258(1947), Madden v. Intern. Union Mline Workers of America, 79 F Supp.
616 (D.D.C. 1948); United States v. Brotherhood of Loco. Engineers,
79 F. Supp. 485 (D.D.C. 1948).
Some of the early cases are: Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Y. Burlington
C. R. & N. Ry., 34 Fed. 481 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888), Beers Y. Wabash,
St. L. & P. Ry., 34 Fed. 244 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888); Toledo A. A. & N. M.
Ry. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 54 Fed. 730 (C.C.N.D. Oluo 1893), W\rater-
house v. Comer, 55 Fed. 149 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1893), United States v. Elliott,
62 Fed. 801 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P
Ry., 62 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894); United States v. Agler, 62 Fed.
824 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (C.C.A. 7th 1894),
United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), hI re Debs, 158
U. S. 564 (1895) ; United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1895).
In re Lennan, 166 U. S. 548 (1897), Wabash R. R. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed.
563 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1903) ; Knudsen v. Beim, 126 Fed. 636 (C.C.D. Minn.
1903), Illinois Cent. R. R. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 190 Fed.
910 (C.C.E.D. Ill. 1911), Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Long Shoremen's
Ass'n, 236 Fed. 964 (W.D. Wash. 1916); Stevens v. Ohio State Tel. Co.,
240 Fed. 759 (N.D. Ohio 1917) ; Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C.C.A. 2d
1921) ; United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. A. F. L., 283 Fed.
479 (N.D. Ill. 1922), 290 Fed. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1923), Western Union v.
Brotherhood of Electrical- Workers, 2 F. 2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1924), 6 F 2d
444 (C.C.A. 7th 1925); Mayo v. Dean, 82 F 2d 554 (C.C.A. 5th 1936).
15. Northwestern Pac. R. R. v. Lumber & Sawmill Wrkrs' Un., 189
P. 2d 277 (Cal. 1948).
1949]
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lic interest and general welfare to be determined in each case by
the facts and attendant circumstances of that particular case.
Only in a jurisdiction such as this, and in the few cases where
the exception proves the rule, can carriers expect any relief as
petitioners in a court of equity
THE CARRIER AS RESPONDENT
Instead of carriers seeking relief from the handicaps to serv-
ice which have been placed in their way by striking, picketing and
boycotting employees, third persons may seek to compel the carriers
to perform their common law or statutory duty Such suit might be
brought for a writ of mandamus or mandatory injunction. The
complaint might be filed by a shipper, an interline connecting
carrier, or any other interested party, or it might be commenced
by the attorney general on behalf of the state. Clearly in such a
suit there is presented a cause for action. But what of the car-
riers' defenses? Here they may fare a bit better than when they
acted as petitioners.
In the first place, they will look into the question of the court's
equitable jurisdiction. The bar of the Norris-La Guardia statute
acts not alone when the carriers are petitioners, but whenever and
wherever there is a labor dispute. So, if there is a labor dispute,
and in the class of cases we are discussing there always is, the re-
spondent carriers will go free, if the conditions, prerequisites and
limitations of the Act have not been met and complied with.'1
The net result of such a successful plea to the jurisdiction,
however, is to leave the carriers just about where they were. In-
deed, the carriers may not care to raise the question of jurisdic-
tion, hoping perhaps that the injunctional orders against them
may be broad enough to reach the employees who are the ones
actually causing the service disturbance. But the unions them-
selves will take care that this does not occur, they will intervene,
and themselves raise the question of jurisdiction. Such were the
tactics employed in the Keystone case.17 So much for the first
defense-to the jurisdiction.
But assume, for any reason, that the foregoing plea is not
raised, or, if raised, is denied. Then the next question which would
16. This was what happened in Southeastern Motor Lines v. Hoover
Truck Co., 34 F Supp. 390 (N.D. Tenn. 1940), Lee Way Motor Freight v.
Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F 2d 931 (C.C.A. 10th 1942), In re Quick
Charge, Inc., 168 F 2d 513 (C.C.A. 10th 1948), Cole v. Atlantic Terminal,
15 F Supp. 131 (N.D. Ga. 1936), cf. Schivera v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 296 N. Y. 26, 69 N. E. 2d 233 (1946).
17 SuPra note 16.
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naturally arise would be. Is this a question for judicial decision,
or for administrative determination? Say the charge made against
the carners is a failure to furnish cars, or the improper declaration
of an embargo, or discrimination in service as between different
shippers. The general rule with respect to this question is that
there must be prior resort to the administrative tribunal for a
determination of the administrative question involved. Tls was
clearly stated by Justice Brandeis in Great Northern v. Merchants
Elevator Co."
"Whenever a rate, rule or practice is attacked as unreasonable
or as unjustly discriminatory, there must be a preliminary resort
to the Commission. Sometimes this is required because the func-
tion being exercised is in its nature administrative, in contra dis-
tinction to judicial. But ordinarily, the determining factor is not
the character of the function, but the character of the controverted
question and the nature of the inquiry necessary for its solution. To
determine what rate, rule or practice shall be deemed reasonable
for the future is a legislative or administrative function. To deter-
mine whether a shipper has in the past been wronged by the
exaction of an unreasonable or discriminatory rate is a judicial
function. Preliminary resort to the Commission is required alike
in the two classes of cases. It is required because the inquiry is
essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters, and
uniformity can only be secured if determination is left to the
Commission. Moreover, that determination is reached ordinarily
upon voluminous and conflicting evidence for the adequate appre-
ciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of trans-
portation is indispensable; and such acquaintance is commonly to
be found only in a body of experts."' 8
A carrier-labor case in point is New York Lumber Trade
Association v. Lacey.19 The Supreme Court of New York said:
"For the reason stated, it may be assumed that it is the rule
that, ordinarily complaints of unfair practices must be submitted
18. 259 U. S. 285, 285-91 (1922). To brief the question of prior resort
would unduly extend this paper. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Cory, 54 F
2d 8 (C.C.A. 6th 1931); Armour v. Alton R. R., 312 U. S. 195 (1941),
General American Tank Car Corp. v. Eldorado Termin. Co., 308 U. S.
422 (1940); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States. 307 U. S. 125, 139
(1939); St. Louis B. & M. R. R. v. Brownsville Na,. Dist., 304 U. S.
295 (1938), United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 284 U. S.
474 (1932). For thorough and scholarly treatment of the question, see
Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the I.C.C., 11 Minn. L.
Rev. (1927); Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Adimnits-
trative Actio);, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 560 (1941) , McAllister, Statutory Road to
Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 129 (1940),
Berger, Exhaust'on of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L. J. 981 (1938).
19. 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 688 (1935), nodificd m 269 N. Y. 677,
200 N. E. 54, cert. denied, 298 U. S. 684 (1936). For case in lower courts




in the first instance to the Commission. Claim is made by the
respondents that the exception to this rule governs here, and that
the unfair practice of which complaint is made, is, in reality, a
discriminatory enforcement of a fair rule. But manifestly the
gravamen of the action is a rule promulgated by the carriers,
which is of general application, and that is to deal with shippers
only in the event their trucks are manned by union employees.
It is the rule itself and not the enforcement thereof which is in
issue here."
20
The Lacey case, incidentally, must be taken as over-ruling the
decision of Burgess Brothers v. Stewart, involving some of the
same defendants and pretty much the same facts, where an in-
junction had been granted without requiring resort to the Com-
mission.2 1
Spiegel Inc. v. The Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Com-
pany, 2 2 involved a labor dispute between Spiegel and its em-
ployees, a strike and picket line. The railroad declared an embargo
to apply to all shipments from and to Spiegel. Spiegel sued the
railroad, praying for an injunction and damages. In an unreported
opinion of Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz, the court said
"In the briefs filed and in oral argument two propositions are
agreed upon by both plaintiff and defendant, as follows
(1) A common carrier may impose embargoes. These are
declarations by a carrier that it will not render service because of
some emergency
(2) An embargo is not lawful unless it is reasonable and the
question of reasonableness is for the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission."
After reviewing the earlier decisions, the court had this to say
"We know that today there can well be labor situations in
which it would be folly to compel a railroad company to supply
service to a shipper regardless of consequences. That means that
under certain conditions they may refuse such services, or in other
words, declare an embargo." * * *
"What is the test to be applied in determining whether the
action of the railroad company amounted to an embargo, the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of which is exclusively within the uris-
diction of the Interstate Commerce Commission? My conclusion is
that the proper test is this-Was the embargo the result of an
administrative policy which the railroad had pursued in order to
serve the public on a reasonably well-founded belief that to do
otherwise would mean a disruption of its public service. In this
case the averments of the answer reveal that the railroad company
20. 245 App. Div. 262, 271, 281 N. Y. Supp. 647, 658 (1935).
21. 112 Misc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1920) , 114 Misc. 673, 187
N. Y. Supp. 873 (1921).
22. Sup. Ct. of Cook County, Ill., Chancery 46 S. 11876 (unreported)
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imposed the embargo in order to prevent the consequences of a
strike and the discontinuance of all service to the public. It is not
important how many shippers were involved. In a tense labor
situation a railroad company might be called upon to decide whether
it will declare an embargo against shipments to the United States
Steel Co., General Motors, or any one of the vast corporations
with which it does business. Number, therefore, is of little im-
portance. The important element in the question of embargo is the
effect on the public service and this can best be determined by a
single tribunal which can make the decision on a national basis."
If inability to furnish service necessitating the declaration of
an embargo constituted an abandonment under paragraphs 18-22
of Section I of Interstate Commerce Act, then a different ques-
tion would arise. But the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Farmers Grain Company v. Toledo P & W R. R.,2
took no stock in such a contention, even in such an extreme and
long drawn out case as was there involved. The court said (p. 117) "
"Appellees urge quite strongly that appellant had abandoned
its railroad because, as it appears, the road cannot operate be-
cause of unlawful interference of the Brotherhoods, and because
of the unlawful refusal of the connecting lines to interchange traf-
fic with appellant. There is no merit in this contention."
Whatever else may be said for or against the opinion in this
case, the court on this point was substantially buttressed by au-
thority; non-use alone is not sufficient but must be accompanied
by intent, to constitute abandonment. A railroad company does not
withdraw from business when it is unable to operate its trains
because its men have struck.
If the plea to the jurisdiction should be overruled, and the plea
of prior resort to the Commission should be denied, then the car-
riers would face the issue on the merits of the case. The cause of
action alleged would be that they had failed in their common law
and statutory duty to furnish service. What of the carriers' excuse
for failure to furnish cars, or failure to receive freight, or failure
to haul promptly and with dispatch? If the failure in any of these
respects has been due to a strike, and if the carrier has acted with
due diligence to avoid the consequences of the strike, then the
defense is a good one.2 4 And this upon the principle that a com-
23. 158 F 2d 109 (C.C.A. 7th 1947), cert. granted, 330 U. S. 816(1947), dismissal ordered, 332 U. S. 748 (1947), dismissed with prejudice
Sept. 22, 1948. See 16 L C. C. Pract. J. 77 (1948).
24. This is a bold statement to make in the face of certain well known
cases. People v. New York Central & H. R. RL, 28 Hun. 543 (N.Y. 1883) ;
McCran v. Public Service Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 At. 205 (1923), 37
Harv. L. Rev. 368, 392 (1924). See Hall, Disconthisance of Ser-,ce, 13
Miun. L. Rev. 181, 325 (1929), Chicago B. & Q. R. M. v. Burlington
19491
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
mon carrier is an insurer only in some respects. In most respects,
and especially under a contract limiting liability, the carrier, like
other bailees, is only required to exercise due care. It is liable only
when negligent-when it fails to exercise the care that an ordi-
narily prudent man would or should exercise under the circum-
stances of the case at the time. This rule of ordinary care, usually
a question of fact, for the discretion of the chancellor, applies just
as well where the departure from duty is occasioned by a strike
as by any other cause.
II.
IN LAW
THE CARRIER AS PLAINTIFF
In the Toledo, P and W R. R. case, Mr. Justice Rutledge had
said that denying the right of injunction did not mean depriving
the carrier of all remedy -5 Left was the right to sue for damages,
and to call on the authorities to prosecute for violation of the crimi-
nal laws. Conceding the correctness of this statement as a matter
of theory, not much can be said for either of the proposed remedies
from the standpoint of practicality or efficiency Even from a
theoretical standpoint, a cause of action would arise only in case
the strike was for an illegal purpose, or being for a lawful object
was being conducted by unlawful means. What would be an tin-
lawful object, or improper methods would depend upon the law
of the state where the damage occurred. The triple damage suits
under the Sherman Act, which figured so largely in the develop-
ment of the law of labor, are no longer available, because labor
and labor unions have been freed from responsibility under the
anti-trust acts.2 6 Because suit would not lie, or because of the
C. R. & U. R. R., 34 Fed. 481 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888), Toledo A. A. &
N. Mich. R. R. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 54 Fed. 730 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893),
Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 Fed. 759 (N.D. Ohio 1917), Buyer v.
Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C.C.A. 2d 1921) Some of these cases arc distinguish-
able; some may simply have to stand for what they are, viz., opposed to
the principle contended for, and here believed to be sound.
25. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Toledo P & W R. R., 321 U. S.
50 (1944).
26. Frankfurter, J., in United Brotherhood v. United States, 330 U. S.
395, 422 (1947) said.
"Practically speaking, the interpretation given by the court to § 6 (of
the Norris-La Guardia Act) serves to immunize unions, especially the more
alert and powerful, as well as corporations involved in labor disputes, from
Sherman Law liability. For those entrusted with the enforcement of the
Sherman Law there may be found in the opinion words of promise to the
ear, but the decision breaks the promise to the hope." See Restatement,
Torts, §§ 775-816 (1939).
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delay, difficulty of securing and collecting judgment, or for what-
ever reason, carriers have not in the past decade sought to avail
themselves of the remedy of a suit for damages.
As to the second, remedy, public prosecution, little need be
said. In the federal courts, at least, the same state of facts which
would prevent equitable relief would equally be a bar to criminal
prosecution. Enforcement of the criminal statutes is conceivable in
those labor cases where murder, arson, or other destruction of
property has been committed, and where public opinion had be-
come sufficiently strong to demand that action be taken.
As a practical matter, neither of the proposed remedies offers
much hope for relief, either to the carriers or to the shippers, or
the public.
THE CARRIER AS DEFENDANT
While the carrier has not availed himself of the privilege to
sue the unions for damages caused by them, there have been a
number of suits against carriers by persons who claimed to have
been damaged, and where the defense was a strike by the carrier's
employees. The first of these cases arose in New York in 1859,2-
and the last of the recorded cases was handed down in 1927.2
Suits against carriers have been of three sorts (1) failure to
receive freight for shipment, or to furnish cars; (2) failure to
transport with proper dispatch; (3) loss and damage in transit.
No distinction can be observed in the measure of responsibility
of' the carrier; in all three of the cases the carrier is held like any
other bailee, to the exercise of ordinary care. This requires a word
of explanation. While the common law rule applicable to loss and
damage to shipments in transit made the carrier liable as an in-
surer, this no longer obtains, because of the provision of the uni-
form bill of lading, which has been prescribed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and has the force and effect of law.2-
The Uniform Bill reads
"Except in case of negligence of the carrier (and the burden
to prove freedom from negligence shall be on the carrier), the
carrier shall not be liable for loss, damage, or delay resulting from
riots or strikes."
And it is to be observed that in all the cases except the first, failure
or refusal to receive, and possibly in the instance of a conversion
27 Blackstock v. New York & Erie R. R., 20 N. Y. 48 (1859).
28. Frawley v. Atchison, T. & S. F Ry., 220 Mo. App. 1189, -99
S. W 93 (1927).
29. In re Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671 (1919), 64 I. C. C. 357(1921), Scott, The Railroad Bill of Lading, 14 I. C. C. Pract. J. 288 (1947).
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by the carrier, the Carmack Amendment" makes the initial and
delivering carriers liable for all acts of default of themselves and
their connecting carriers. This vicarious responsibility applies to
delay as well as loss or damage.
This raises the point that Congress, having exclusively occu-
pied the field of regulation and control of interstate carriers
through the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, including the
Carmack Amendment, the rule to be applied in the fixing of re-
sponsibility for damages due to a strike, is that of the federal courts,
not that of the highest court of the state, notwithstanding the deci-
sion in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.31 This conclusion is reached in
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger" in which the Supreme Court
held that the law of the state where the action was brought was
not controlling
"That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies
of a particular state upon the same subject results from its general
character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier
under the bill of lading which he must issue and limits the power to
exempt himself by rule, regulation or contract. Almost every de-
tail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no
rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the
subject and supersede all state regulations or interference with it."
The question may not assume practical importance. Neverthe-
less, the federal cases will be looked into for the purpose of dis-
covering whether or not there is a federal rule on the subject.83
A carrier, confronted with a claim that he has refused to receive
freight when it has been tendered, or that he has refused to fur-
nish a car when demanded, or that he has failed to handle the
shipment with dispatch, or that he has damaged or lost the goods
in transit, undertakes to excuse his admitted default by pleading a
strike. It may be a strike of his own employees, or those of a con-
necting carrier, or it may be because of a picket line thrown out by
the employees of a third person. What of such a defense?
In the first place, the carrier will look into the question of prior
resort. And here, as in the case of equitable relief, if there be an
administrative question the court will have to dismiss the case, or
stay its hand until the Interstate Commerce Commission renders
its determination. There would be such administrative question
clearly where the carrier failed to furnish cars, where the carrier
30. Carmack Amendment, 34 Stat. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
31. 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
32. 226 U. S. 491, 505-506 (1913).
33. 26 Col. L. Rev. 876 (1926) The Commentator here raises a ques-
tion as to whether there is a distinctive Federal rule.
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declared an embargo, or where the carrier was charged with dis-
crimination. There might be others. This preliminary question dis-
posed of, the cases then proceed to the merits.
First. The Rule in the Federal Courts.
The federal rule was established by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, in Empire Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia &
R. Coal Co., Judge Sanborn writing the opinion.3 4 Libels against
the ship company for failure to discharge the vessel promptly, had
been dismissed in the lower court, and the libelants appealed. The
defense was that in the presence of a strike, the ship company had
exercised reasonable diligence. The decision of the lower court was
affirmed. The implied contract, said the court, was to unload within
such time as is reasonable, in view of all existing facts and circum-
stances, ordinary and extraordinary, legitimately bearing upon
that question at the time of her arrival and discharge. The implied
contract to discharge within a reasonable time is, in effect, a con-
tract to discharge her with reasonable diligence. Proof that the
vessel was delayed in unloading beyond the customary time for
unloading such cargoes at the port of her delivery, throws upon
the charterer the burden of excusing the delay by proof of the
actual circumstances of the delivery and his reasonable diligence
thereunder. The rule so established has been consistently followed,
as indicated by the cases cited in the notes.3 5 Admitting that the
Supreme Court in the Olivit case3" may not have hit the nail
squarely on the head, it at least found no fault with what the lower
court had done. In three of the Circuits the same rule is authorita-
tively laid down, which the Supreme Court passed over without
exception.
It is clear to the writer that there is a federal rule on the sub-
ject of the carriers' liability for the consequences growing out of a
strike, and that such federal rule would prevail over any contrary
state rule. It is equally clear that the rule established by the federal
decisions is the general rule of reasonable care under all the facts
and circumstances prevailing at the time.
34. Empire Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 77
Fed. 919 (C.C.A. 8th 1896).
35. Describing them as analogous cases, the court cited Greismer v.
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 102 N. Y. 563, 571, 7 N. E. 828 (1886), Pitts-
burgh, Ft. Wayne & C. Ry. v. Hazen, 84 Ill. 36, 38 (1876), Pittsburgh,
Cinm. & St. L. Ry. v. Hollowell, 65 Ind. 188, 195 (1879), Gulf C. & S. F
Ry. v. Levi, 76 Tex. 337, 343, 13 S. W 191 (1890). This decision in the
8th Circuit was followed with approval in Marshall v. McNear. 121 Fed.
428 (N.D. Cal. 1903), In re 2098 Tons of Coal. 135 Fed. 317 (C.C.A. 7th
1905), The Toronto, 174 Fed. 632 (C.C.A. 2d 1909), The Richland Queen,
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Second. The Rule m the State Courts.
Time will not permit an analysis of all the many state court
decisions. Certain decisions have been selected and given the
designation of leading cases. But all the cases are cited in a foot-
note. On considering these cases, what was said obiter, has been
carefully distinguished from what was actually decided, and there
has been kept in mind the period in which the judgment was
handed down.
3 7
In Greismer v. Lakeshore R. Co.,3 the Court of Appeals ot
New York laid down, as far back as 1886, the general rule ap-
254 Fed. 668 (C.C.A. 2d 1918) The court in the latter case altogether dis-
approved of the arbitrary distinction laid down in such cases as Blackstock
v. New York & Erie R. R., 20 N. Y. 48 (1859) and Greismer v. Lake
Shore & M. S. Ry., 102 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. 828 (1886), the first hokling
that a peaceable strike would not excuse, the latter holding that a strike
with violence would constitute a defense. Finally, the Supreme Court de-
cision in Pennsylvania R. R. v. Olivit Bros., 243 U. S. 574 (1917), though
leaving something to be desired by way of clear cut decisiveness, could not
have been decided the way it was had the court disagreed with the principle
laid down in the Empire case, and others in the various Federal courts which
followed in its wake.
36. Pennslyvama R. R. v. Olivit Bros., 243 U. S. 574 (1917)
37 It has been helpful to consider the cases in the light of a siuple
chronological division, The Old Cases, being those decided before 1890,
The Middle Period Cases, being those handed down between 1890 and
1932, and The Recent Period Cases, being those decided since 1932. Tils
division is more or less arbitrary, but nevertheless based upon sonie logical
reasoning. See Ronney, Federal Interventio in Labor Disputes, 7 Mmin. L.
Rev. 467 (192,3), Commons, History of Labor in the United States. Vols.
1 and 2. The first period was one when labor disturbances were compara-
tively rare, of local interest and effect, and strikes were so little known
and understood as to require the use of quotation marks when referring
to them in the Courts' opinions. There was no permanent, self-conscious
labor class, and no stable national organizations giving to members of this
class unity of aim and action. The Middle Period was marked by the Pullnan
strike of 1894, the Engineers' strike of 1911, the Conductors' and Train-
men's strike of 1912, the threatened nationwide strike of 1916, and the
switchmen's and shop strike of the early '20s. All of these were national
in scope, resulting in the people and Congress becoming very much strike
conscious. This was the period of the passage of the Erdman Act, in
1898, the Newland Act in 1913, and the Adamson Act in 1916. Labor dis-
putes and their settlement had become a national issue, to be nationally
handled. The discussion passed from voluntary arbitration to some form
of compulsory arbitration and prohibition of strikes. The Recent Period
is marked by the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932. the
Wagner Act in 1935, the Wage and Hour Act in 1938. The weight of
government was thrown into the scale on the side of labor. Manifestly the
judges who wrote the opinions and handed down the decisions reflect their
education, environment and class consciousness. The manner of expression
and the decisions themselves can only be understood by taking into account
the economics, the sociology, the psychology, and the politics that went to
make up the inarticulate premise of the judgments rendered. What is rea-
sonable for a carrier in the Old or the Middle Periods would no longer
necessarily be reasonable in the Recent Period.
38. 102 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. 828 (1886).
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plicable to a strike, which has pervaded the cases ever since. Tile
court planted itself squarely on the doctrine of reasonable care.
"In the absence of special contract, there is no absolute duty
resting upon a railroad carrier to deliver goods intrusted to it
within what under ordinary circumstances would be a reasonable
time. Not only storms and floods and other natural causes may
excuse delay, but the conduct of men may also do so. * * * The
only duty resting upon the carrier, not otherwise in fault, is to use
reasonable efforts and due diligence to overcome the obstacles thus
interposed, and to forward the goods to their destination."
This then, together with the doctrine of prior resort laid down
in the Lacey case2 9 can easily be said to represent the New York
view: reasonable care under all the circumstances. This would
cause us to lay aside as controlling such adventitious factors as
whether or not the strikers were still employees or had severed
their relations, whether the carrier had made effort to secure other
men, or disciplined the men it had by discharge. All of these factors
and many more would be taken into account and be given con-
sideration when the court or jury came to make up its final verdict,
the final conclusion as to whether, under all the facts and circum-
stances, ordinary or extraordinary, existing at the time, the carrier
did exercise reasonable diligence. Certainly the rigid rule laid down
by the Court in 1859, in the Blackstock case, was substantially
modified or overruled.40
Before leaving the Atlantic Seaboard, let us take a look at a
frequently cited case from Maine.4 .
"Some authorities support the Plaintiffs' contention that a
'peaceable strike' cannot be a good defense to an action against a
carrier for delay in transporting goods entrusted to it for carriage.
* ** The opinions in these cases must be based upon one of two
theories:
(1) That one who has been an employee, but who has struck
and refused to return to work, is still an employee for whose
conduct the employer is responsible.(2) That a common carrier's implied contract of insurance
applies not only to safety, but to promptness of transportation, and
(if applicable to the case at bar) extends not only to goods re-
ceived for carriage, but to those tendered though not received. We
think that neither of these theories is sound. * * *
For damages caused by mere delay the carrier is responsible
only when it fails to exercise reasonable care."
39. New York Lumber Ass'n v. Lacey, 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 54(1935).
40. Blackstock v. New York & E. R. R., 20 N. Y. 48 (1859). See
note 35 .supra for holding.




What is reasonable depends upon the "circumstances of the par-
ticular case." The same rule is applicable to freight tendered, and
not received, as to freight received and delayed in carriage.
Dropping down to North Carolina, we find the case of Murphy
Hardware Co. v. Railway Co., holding that a carrier unable to
transport cattle, because its motive power was tied up with a strike,
would not be liable for the statutory penalty for its refusal to
receive the stock.42 The Maryland case of American Ry. Express
Co. v. Peninsula Produce Exchange held the trial court had not
erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the express company 
43
A short quotation from the opinion in a Florida case,4" will be
in order
"When the employees of a carrier by agreement and concert
of action refuse to perform their duties to the public which their
several occupations require of them, and thus prevent the corpora-
tion from functioning, it is none the less a condition over which the
corporation has no control. * * * The situation described by the
pleas cannot be compared with the case of one employee who, upon
his own initiative refuses to work, where his place can be filled
by another with sufficient diligence by the carrier to prevent
delays in the performance of the carrier's duty "
Moving over to the west we find the same general rule being
applied to the furnishing of coal cars by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky 45 And still further west, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
said
"It appears from the record that a switchmen's strike in the
City of Kansas City, Mo., caused all railroads which entered the
city to refrain from receiving freight from connecting carriers.
* * * On account of the embargo on freight consigned to K. C., it
did not receive the shipment of hogs in question. The strike was
not in any manner induced or caused by appellee. It had nothing
whatever to do with it, and the embargo placed on freight con-
signed to Kansas City prevented it from receiving the hogs for
shipment. The testimony on this branch of the case was undisputed,
and it follows that under the law above announced, the court was
right in directing a verdict for appellee.
' 4
1
In Texas the same view of reasonableness as the test is fol-
lowed in a long line of cases, topped by Panhandle & Santa Fe v.
42. 150 N. C. 703, 64 S. E. 873 (1909)
43. American Ry. Express v. Peninsula Prod. Ex., 142 Md. 422. 121
Atl. 240 (1923)
44. American Ry. Express Co. v. Johnson, 87 Fla. 451, 100 So. 743,
745 (1924)
45. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Queen City Coal Co., 99 Ky. 217, 35 S. NV
626 (1896).
46. Gage v. Arkansas Central R. R., 160 Ark. 402, 254 S. W 665 (1923)
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Thompson. 47 Following around the circle of states, we come to
Riddle v. Chicago B. & Q.4S in Iowa, Ritcle v. Oregon Short
Line,4 9 in Idaho, and Hines v. American Fruit Distributors in
Califorma," and then to complete the circle, mention is made of
Leavens v. American Exp. Co., in Vermont.5  The English an-
nounce the same rule.5 2 In all of these cases, what is reasonable
under all the circumstances, is the rule which has been applied.
Not all the cases, particularly those in the Old Period,"' bear
the imprint of uniformity in expression. Indeed some of them em-
ploy expressions and use language that sound strangely in our
ears today. But making due allowance for the strangeness of the
terminology, it is believed that throughout most of the cases runs
this strong cord-of reasonableness and due care. To what extent
the rulings in Georgia and Missouri, when thoroughly analyzed,
run counter to the general trend cannot be here gone into. Space
will not permit. Statutes in those states may have influenced the
result.5
4
47 Panhandle v. Thompson, 235 S. W 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
48. 203 Iowa 1232, 210 N. W 770 (192-6).
49. 42 Idaho 193, 244 Pac. 580 (1926).
50. American Fruit Dist. v. Hines, 55 Cal. App. 377, 203 Pac. 821 (2d
App. Dist. 1921).
51. 86 Vt 342, 85 Ati. 557 (1913).
52. Hackney Borough Council v. Dore, 152 L. T. 383 (K.B. 1921);
Hick v. Raymond [1893] A. C. 22; Sims v. Midland [1913] 1 K. B. 103.
53. See supra Note 37
54. The cases selected for comment in the body of the article are, in
the opinion of the writer, the leading cases in their respective jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, there have been gathered together in this note all the cases.
From an examination of these cases, in addition to the ones cited in the
text, it is confidently believed that the general rule of due care will receive
emphasis--always with a caveat that the early cases were decided in an
atmosphere wholly different from that with which we are now confronted.
Ark. Johnesborro, L. C. & E. R. R. v. Maddy, 157 Ark. 484, 248 S. W
911 (1923); Chicago, R. L & P Ry. v. Dawson, 157 Ark. 460, 248 S. W
558 (1923); St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Clay County Gin Co., 77 Ark 357,
92 S. W. 531 (1906); Hines v. Mason, 144 Ark. 11, 221 S. W 861 (1920),
St Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Watts, 168 Ark 804, 271 S. W 464 (1925).
Cal. Elliott v. Southern Pacific Co., 145 Cal. 441, 79 Pac. 42 (1904), Foley
v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 69 Cal. App. 669, 232 Pac. 169 (3d App. Dist.
1924).
Ga. The leading case in this state is Haas v. Kansas City, F S. & G. R. R,
81 Ga. 792, 7 S. E. 69 (1888). See also Central of Georgia R. R. v. Georgia
Fruit, 91 Ga. 389, 17 S. E. 904 (1893), Savannah v. Shuman, 91 Ga. 400,
17 S. E. 937 (1893); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R.,
15 Ga. App. 751, 84 S. E. 198 (1915); Burgess v. Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry
148 Ga. 415, 96 S. E. 684 (1918), Southern Ry. v. Atlanta Sand Co., 135
Ga. 35, 68 S. E. 807 (1910).
Ill. Pittsburgh, Ft W. & C. R. R. v. Hagen, 84 I1. 36 (1876), Sinsabaugh
v. Cleveland, C. C. & St L. Ry., 149 Ill. App. 430 (3d Dist 1909), Indian-
apolis & St. L. Ry. v. Juntgen, 10 Il1. App. 295 (3d Dist. 1881).
Ind. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v. Hollowell. 65 Ind. 188 (1879);




BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
So far it has been seen that, confronted with a strike, a picket
line, or a boycott, the chances of carriers securing affirmative re-
lief at the hands of the courts, either in equity or at law, either
civil or criminal, were practically nil. It has also been seen that
interruption in service from these causes has laid the carriers
open to various serious consequences and to actions and proceed-
ings against them, both from the public as a whole, and from indi-
vidual members. On the purely defensive side the carriers fared
somewhat better. They could plead the Norris La Guardia Act;
they could plead the existence of a strike, justifying the laying of
an embargo, and if they could show freedom from negligence they
would be entitled to a verdict of the jury or a judgment of the
court. They could also claim the presence of an administrative
question and seek the prior determination of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.
Another perplexity besets the carriers. It is to have a com-
plaint filed against them with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, or other regulatory body having jurisdiction, alleging failure
Bartlett v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Ry., 94 Ind. 281 (1883)
Ky. L. & N. R. R. v. Bell, 13 Ky. L. R. 393 (1891)
Mass. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 88 N. E. 2d 685 (1942)
Miss. Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Brichetti, 72 Miss. 891, 18 So. 421 (1895)
Mo. The leading case is Read v. St. Louis, Kas. C. & Northern R. R., 60
Mo. 199 (1875) Other cases, Morrison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 264
S. W 449 (Mo. App. 1924), Jackson v. Chicago, R. I. & P Ry., 265
S. W 847 (Mo. App. 1924), Warner v. St. Louis-S. F Ry., 218 Mo. App.
314, 274 S. W 90 (1925), Buschow Lbr. Co. v. Union Pacific R. R., 220
Mo. App. 743. 276 S. W 409 (1925) , Mourer v. Wabash Ry., 222 Mo. App.
495, 280 S. W 1050 (1926), 35 Harv. L. Rev. 623 (1922), 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 648 (1926), 26 Col. L. Rev. 876 (1926)
N Y People v. New York C. and H. R. R., 28 Hun. 543 (N.Y. 1882).
Blackstock v. New York C. and H. R. R., 20 N. Y. 48 (1859) , Greisner v.
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 102 N. Y 563, 7 N. E. 828 (1886), Little v.
Fargo, 43 Hun. 233 (N.Y. 1887), Reardon v. Caton, 189 App. Div. 501, 178
N. Y. Supp. 713 (1919), reversing 177 N. Y Supp. 802 (1919), Reardon
v. International Mercantile M. Co.. 189 App. Div. 515, 178 N. Y Supp. 722
(1919) , Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1920),
114 Misc. 673. 187 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1921), Hance Bros. v American
Express Co.. 116 Misc. 653, 190 N. Y. Supp. 530 (1921)
Tex. International Ry v. Tisdale. 74 Tex. 8, 11 S. W 900 (1889), Gulf
C. & S. F Ry. v. Levi, 76 Tex. 337 13 S. W 191 (1890), Gulf C. & S. F
Ry. v. Gatewood, 79 Tex. 189, 14 S. W 913 (1890) Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Levi. 4 Willson Civ Cases 9 (Tex. App.), 14 S. W 1062 (1889) South-
ern Pac. Ry. v. Johnson, 4 Willson Civ. Cases 45. 15 S. W 121 (Tex.
1890) Sterling v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry.. 38 Tex. Civ App. 451. 86
S. W 655 (1905) Missouri K. & T Ry v. Woods. 117 S. W 196 (Tex.
Civ App. 1909) , Southern Pac. Ry. v. Stell, 15 S. W 122 (Tex. Civ. App.
1890) , Galveston H. S. A. v. Karrer, 109 S. W 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908)
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to perform the duty required as common carriers by the statute,
asking for a cease and desist order with ultimate possibility of loss
of certificate. Such cases have been brought against carriers, and
it is the purpose of these paragraphs to briefly examine them. What
the Commission has done with these complaint cases gives a fair
indication of its conception of the law applicable to strikes, and
presages what it would do if called upon to render administrative
rulings in any proceeding involving similar facts and circum-
stances.
The most recent complaint case is that of Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Chicago M. S. P and P. Ry.5" The strike here was called
by a CIO union which represented the complainant's warehouse
and clerical employees. The picket line turned back both truck and
rail employees of the carriers, because of the generally threatening
attitude of the pickets. The Ward Company's principal charge of
negligence against the railroad was that it made no effort to secure
or obtain non-union drivers. The Commission dismissed the com-
plaint saying that it was clear from the testimony that any effort
to employ non-umon men to break the picket line would have
resulted in a strike by the union trainmen, a complete stoppage
of traffic with disastrous results to the public.
In deciding the case as it did, the Commission fully recognized
the general rule laid down by the courts, that under the common
law the carrier lay under no absolute duty to serve. It was only
required to exercise the diligence of an ordinarily prudent man
under the circumstances. Any effort to secure non-union men
under the prevailing agreements and circumstances could only
have resulted in failure. Success in obtaining non-union men by
the route of disciplining and discharging its union men, and having
the non-union men try to run the picket line, would by comparison
cause a greater disaster to the public than merely failing or refus-
ing temporarily to serve an individual shipper.
The commission in deciding thus case, followed its ruling in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightwas,0 and
distinguished under the fact its previous rulings in Planters &
Chocolate Co. v. American Transfer 7 and Montgomery Ward v.
Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co.58 In the Consolidated Freightways,9
the Commission said:
55. 268 I. C. C. 257 (1947).
56. 42 M. C. C. 225 (1943).
57 31 M. C. C. 719 (1942).
58. 42 M. C. C. 212 (1943).
59. 42 M. C. C. 225 (1943).
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"We find that the defendant's failure to serve the complainant
was primarily caused by a strike at complainant's plant, for which
the defendants were not responsible, and that because of the strike
they were physically prevented from serving the complainant, and
accordingly their conduct was within the limitations and condi-
tions of the applicable tariff with respect to impracticable operation
and not unlawful. The relief sought is, in substance, an order to
the defendants, commanding them to serve the complainant re-
gardless of their incapacity to do so because of a strike and be-
cause of their labor agreements. As the defendants do not control
the situation, and as an order could not be directed against their
employees, or the union, the practical effect of such an order would
be to embroil the defendants in a labor dispute with their own
employees, and would merely add to the defendants' difficulties."
Again quoting from the Commission in the Consolidated
Freightways case
"Common carriers are bound to transport goods promptly, but
they are not insurers of prompt transportation. Their duty is that
of reasonable diligence. For mere delay not affecting the safety
of the merchandise transported, there is no liability if due dili-
gence is proved."
"A common carrier's duty to receive and transport is not an
absolute one, but is subject to reasonable limitations and condi-
tions, and it may refuse to receive property for shipment if trans-
portation on its lines, or the lines of a connecting carrier, has
become impossible or impracticable because of circumstances be-
yond its control as for a strike, the strike not being induced or
caused by the carrier.
0
All through the law on this subject, whether before commission
or courts, runs the common theme "What is reasonable under
the circumstances," and "What is reasonable depends upon the
facts and circumstances," and this may be an administrative
question. Whether the facts of reasonable care and due diligence
are to be determined by a jury in a damage case, acting under in-
structions of the court, by a court acting through a chancellor to
decide whether an injunction shall issue, or by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in passing on the administrative question
of whether the policy of the carrier is reasonable and in the public
interest, the judicial process is the same.
A thoughtful writer in Columbia Law Review,"' writing in
1920, said
60. The decision of the I. C. C. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v.
Consolidated Freightwavs, Inc., 42 I. C. C. 225. was on quite a different
record and state of facts from that involved in Consolidated Freight Lines v.
Department, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of \Vashiigton in 200
Wash. 659, 94 P 2d 484 (1939)
61. 26 Col. L. Rev 876 (1920)
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"It seems then that in all his functionings the general rule is
that the carrier, is bound to use due diligence to avoid causing loss
or damage to the shipper; and the courts feel that it is so essential
to maintain this duty that as an indirect sanction no effect will be
given to a contract clause limiting it. The care and diligence the
carrier has to exercise, the lengths to which he has to go are
measured necessarily by the position he occupies in the economic
system as a public utility, the integral part he plays in the develop-
ment of the country, the reliance placed upon him by business men
and the current sense of economic wastefulness of a given mode
of conduct.
"It is at once obvious that the jurisdictions which hold a carrier
liable for delays due to a strike, irrespective of care in maintaining
service, are departing in this type of case from the general rules
as to a carrier's liability. The jurisdictions which excuse the car-
rier, provided he has used due care to maintain his service during
the strike, are obviously attempting to make the scope of his
liability as nearly coextensive with general rules as to a carrier's
liability as the courts consider feasible."
If the writer of that article had had the benefit of the decisions
since 1920, he would have been struck with the greater unammity
now existing.
Consider realities. Must the carrier discharge its employees
because they will not go through a picket line? Assuming that he
has the power to do so, and that is very doubtful, where will he
go to get others?
"Let us suppose," said Senator A. 0. Stanley,0 2 "that two
million men should at the same time and by common agreement,
all quit their work at the stroke of the clock. NWhat are you going
to do with them? Put them m jail? When you did, when the last
railroader is in jail, who would run your railroads ?"
The Commission, in these cases, uniformly refused to hold
that the carriers were acting m derogation of their legal duty be-
cause for a time they failed to serve a shipper. The Commission
further declined to consider alone the interest of the individual
shipper, but included in its consideration the paramount interest
of the whole public. Similarly, in declining to decree specific per-
formance in favor of the Gulf Mobile and Northern, a federal court
said :6
"Is the public interest concerned in the instant litigation? Un-
questionably, it is. If the full relief prayed for by the plaintiff be
granted, and the defendant company is required to permit the
62. 59 Cong. Rec. 672 (Dec. 16, 1919). The subject matter of debate
was compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.




operation of the plaintiff's trains over the former's tracks, manned
by the latter's employees, it is evident from the affidavits in the
record that a strike vote will be taken by the employees of the
Illinois Central Railroad, with the belief expressed under oath by
the Railroad Brotherhood chiefs, that a strike will be decreed by
the membership of these unions, in which the majority of the
employees of both the plaintiff and the defendant hold membership.
"The 6,477 men employed by the defendant railroad have the
unquestioned lawful right to strike. This right is guaranteed in
express terms in Sec. 2, par. 10 of the Railway Labor Act.
"The lines of the Illinois Central Railroad approximate 7,000
miles of trackage, and extend through 14 states of the Union. A
large volume of traffic is, of course, affected by the extensive
operation, and many cities, towns, hamlets and communities de-
pend exclusively on this particular railroad for freight and pas-
senger transportation. The moving of the products of farm and
factory, and the interchange of commodities are directly involved.
"It requires no elaboration of detail to conclude that the rub-
lic interest and general welfare is involved in the avoidance o the
paralyzing effect of a lawful strike by the employees of a great
railroad system, upon agriculture, industry, and commerce, in the
consequential damage to myriads of human beings."
If public policy held the hand of the court from granting decree
of injunction and specific performance, if public policy restrained
the Commission from granting cease and desist orders, then, by the
same token, a carrier, acting on its own initiative in the first
instance, would be justified in refraining from action that could




Judge Killitts, in the course of his opinion, in Stephens v. Ohto
State Tel. Co., 4 said
"Two maxims, which have much the same meaning, are uni-
versally treated as controlling all legislation and as limiting all
personal rights. They are Salus populi est suprema lex, and, salus
reipublicae suprema lex. Liberally translated they mean that the
public welfare is the first and supreme consideration. They are the
law of all courts and of all countries. Individual rights universally
are and plainly must be subordinated to the public good, and of this
principle we have many applications of which the superior quality
of the public's interest in the service of a public utility vitally con-
cerning the public welfare is one. Congress must be considered to
have legislated in the light of this principle, which must be resorted
64. 240 Fed. 759 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
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to as an essential criterion of interpretation of the acts of all
legislatures."
When Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act
-1947, it did not leave its interpretation to the maxims above
described, but spelled them out in the very forefront of the law.
A common carrier has devoted his property and business to the
public interest; that interest is paramount to private property and
private interests. A laborer is given the right to organize, and
being organized, to further his own good in the area of his proper
economic self-interest. Both of these are deemed to be in the
public interest. But here again, the overall public interest is para-
mount to the private interest and the economic welfare of the
individual.
When the selfish interest of the grain elevators and the rail-
roads conflicted with the paramount interest of the public, the
courts held that the legislatures could regulate and control. Hence
the public utility commissions and the Interstate Commerce Act.
The same principle applies to labor unions, grown national in
scope and powerful in resources of money and men. Clearly the
legislatures and Congress can regulate the right to strike, the right
to boycott, the right to picket. This statement is made in full recog-
nition of what the Supreme Court has said in the Thornhill case,0i
to the effect that so long as picketing remains peaceful and stays
in its own proper area, it is merely persuasion, free speech and as
such constitutionally protected.
When the right and duty of a carrier to serve come in conflict
with the right and duty of a union to represent its members and
advance their interests, and in so doing to employ the weapons of
private warfare, the strike, the picket, the boycott, then as a matter
of feasibility and practicability, it is the legislature and not the
courts which should settle the controversy. Such delicately balanced
questions are primarily subjects of legislative determination.
The people have recognized here an intolerable situation. Wholly
sympathetic with labor's legitimate aims, they still feel that the
public as a whole, is called upon to pay entirely too high a price.
And one of these prices has been deprivation of necessary trans-
portation service from its common carrier agencies. This feeling
on the part of the people has reached the ears of their representa-
tives both in state legislatures, and, somewhat more slowly, in
65. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Carpenters & Joiners
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942), Bakery & Pastry Drivers
Union v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
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Congress, with result that many laws in many states have been
enacted having for their object the placing of some limit and con-
dition on the right to strike in the public utility field. Some of these
more noteworthy legislative efforts are cited in the footnote, with-
out purpose to make the list complete. 6 It will suffice to comment
briefly on three such efforts.
For the first of these, attention is called to the secondary boycott
and sympathetic strike provisions of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947 1, Sec. 8(b) (4) (A) makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization, or its agents, to engaged in a strike,
or in a concerted refusal to use, transport, or otherwise handle any
goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to perform any serv-
ices where an object of such strike or concerted refusal is to force
any employers to cease using, transporting or otherwise handling
the products of any other producer, processor, manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person. While the definitions
of "employer" and "employee" categorically exclude persons sub-
ject to the Railway Labor Act and the employees of such persons,
nevertheless the provisions of Sec. 8(b) do cover the acts and
activities of all others, and it is the activity of these other employees
in the secondary boycott cases that causes most of the trouble to
the common carriers.
A violation of Sec. 8(b) (4) (A) can be handled in the ordinary
way as an unfair labor practice by the National Labor Relations
Board. In addition the Board is required, if a charge has been filed,
and if it reasonably believes such a violation of the Act is being
carried on, to petition the federal court for a temporary injunc-
tion, and in such case the Norris-La Guardia Act will not act as
66. This compilation of state statutes affecting public utility employees
is lifted from a footnote in 1 Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 492
(1948). Fla. Laws, c. 23911, §§ 1-19 (1947) (compulsory arbitration, strikes
forbidden) , Ind. Laws, c. 341 §§ 1-18 (1947) (compulsory arbitration,
strikes forbidden) , Kan. Gen. Stat., § 44-620 (1935) (state seizure of
utility) , § 44-617 (strikes and picketing forbidden) , Mass. Laws, c. 596
(1947) (state seizure, strikes forbidden) , Mich. Acts, Pub. Act No. 318
(1947) (compulsory arbitration) , Mo. Laws, H. B. 180, §§ 1-22 (1947)
(compulsory arbitration, state seizure) , N. J. Pub. Laws, c. 47 (1947)
(compulsory arbitration, state seizure) , Neb. Laws, L. B. 537 (1947) (coin-
pulsory court action, strikes forbidden) , N. D. Rev. Code, § 73-0106 (1943)
(state seizure) , Pa. Act, Act. No. 485 (1947) (compulsory arbitration),
Texas Laws S. B. 178 (1947) (picketing of a utility forbidden) , Va. Laws.
H. B. 6-x (1947) (state seizure, strikes and picketing forbidden) \Vis.
Laws, c. 414 (1947) (compulsory arbitration, strikes forbidden). See Stale
Regulation of Labor Unions, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 505 (1947), 33 Minn. L.
Rev. 314 (1949).
67 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U. S. C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
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restraint on the equity powers of the court.6s A third remedy is
provided in Section 303 of the Act, by way of suit for damages in
the federal court against any union or union officer who commits
these acts.
In an intermediate report filed by Examiner Frederic B. Parkes,
2nd, of the N. L. R. B., dated June 25, 1948, it appeared that six
rice mills in Louisiana had filed a charge with the Board, alleging
that in the course of a strike by certain of its employees, the Union
had placed pickets at or near the mills and across the tracks of the
Texas & New Orleans and N. 0. T. & M. Railroads. As a result
of threats, the train crews refused to cross the picket line because
they feared for their safety, both on and off the job. A temporary
injunction had been obtained.
The Examiner said:
"Nowhere in the congressional history of the act is there any
intimation that Congress did not intend that Section 8(b), sub-
sections 4A and 4B, of the Taft Hartley Act, should not apply to a
situation such as the instant proceeding, where the railroads,
neutral to the primary dispute between the respondent and the
complainants, became involved in the controversy through activi-
ties of the respondent. On the contrary, the prevailing intent of
the statute is to remove such obstructions and to protect commerce
from such injury, impairment or interruption. Acceptance of the
position advanced by the respondent would remove from the ambit
of Sec. 8(b), sub-sections 4A and 4B, the industry possibly most
directly and extensively concerned with commerce, namely, the
vast railroad transportation system, would violate the clear intent
of Congress in enactment of the section, and would to a considerable
extent, vitiate the Act."8' 9
Should this report be accepted by the Board and approved by
the courts, certain questions will be raised, which the carriers will
need to ponder.
What in the light of such a decision is the exercise of reasonable
care on the part of the carriers to escape from the effect of a
strike? What could or should a reasonable man do to obviate the
restraint and surmount the hurdle of a strike? Certainly the car-
riers must take advantage of all available remedies that are found
to be reasonably clear and open. *rell, here is a remedy - Is it
available to the carriers?
The second effort of the people to solve this problem of secon-
68. Section 10(l) of the Act. For cases issuing such an injunction see
Lockhart, The "New" National Labor Relations Act it Operation: First
Eight Months, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 663, 725-28 (1948).
69. In the matter of International Bro. of Teamsters v. Rice Milling
Co., No. 15 I. C. C. 1, 2, 3 & 4.
19491
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dary boycotts in the field of transportation, was accomplished in
Texas, by an application of the anti-trust statutes of the state.
Activities of a union and its business agent in inducing common
carriers not to cross picket lines at freight agency where there was
a strike were enjoined as violating the state anti-trust law which
expressly prohibited boycott agreements.70
The people of California undertook to solve the problem by
way of the "hot cargo, and secondary boycott act" approved by a
referendum of the people November 3, 1942.71 Suffice to say that
its provisions were quite similar to the secondary boycott provi-
sions of Sec. 8(b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Although the Supreme Court of California held the act void as
applied to the particular facts involved in the case before it,12 the
way is still left open for effort along the main lines of the statute.
The Texas anti-trust acts were the forerunners of the Sherman
Act, the language being in effect if not literally the same. Here is
a pattern for Congress to follow Should the people so demand all
that would be necessary would be for Congress to express its own
intent in clear language, indicating what it intends the Sherman
Act to cover, rather than, as at present, to leave its purpose to the
interpretation of the Supreme Court.
Enough has been shown, it would seem, to demonstrate that the
approach to the problem through legislation is possible and prac-
ticable. By reference to the 1947 federal act, to the Texas Anti-
Trust acts, and the secondary boycott statutes of California and
other states,73 a way is indicated by which the will of the people
when sufficiently aroused, may be translated into action. When
the evil becomes sufficiently acute, when the burden of interrupted
transportation becomes sufficiently heavy, the power to effect a
cure lies at hand, and is ample for the purpose.
"When the tale of bricks was doubled then came Moses."
SUIMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In broad terms, the effort has been to set forth the trials and
tribulations of common carriers when confronted with a strike
and its accompaniments. The further effort has been made to show
that, difficult as the carrier's position is and full of perplexities,
70. Turner v. Zanes, 206 S. W 2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
71. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1131-36 (1941)
72. In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 184 P 2d 892 (1947)
73. Twelve states have passed laws of the same general character-
California. Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri. North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah. The Pennsylvania statute has
been upheld in Cleveland Simpson Co. v. American Com. Ass'n, 3 C. C. 11.
Labor L. Serv. 64-125 (1947)
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the position of the public dependent upon the carriers for transpor-
tation is worse.
The effort of the carriers to help themselves through their own
efforts, or by calling to their aid the civil or military authorities,
has not generally proven successful under existing law and under
present state of public opinion. So, acting or attempting to serve
in the affirmative, the carriers are practically helpless.
When put upon the defensive, the carrier fares somewhat bet-
ter, but even here there is much of uncertainty and confusion. Not
so much does this uncertainty exist in the broad principles of law
applicable to the situation as in the practical effect of such prin-
ciples upon the day by day, even rmnute by minute, conduct of
its affairs by the responsible officers of the carriers when con-
fronted by a picket line or boycott. It is easy enough for the courts
to say that the carriers through their officers, must act as ordi-
narily prudent men would act under all the facts and circum-
stances, ordinary and extraordinary, confronting them at the time.
But there is no such "ordinarily prudent man" or "reasonable
man" or "average normal man", nobody to consult in advance.
So the carriers and their officers must endeavor to use their best
judgment under all the circumstances. When they use that best
judgment, in good faith, and with eye single to the best possible
public good, they should then be excused, even though their judg-
ment may have proved faulty. But unfortunately this is not yet
clearly the law. The result of their conduct must be left to the
judgment of a court, and the arbitrament of a jury. The Interstate
Commerce Commission seems most nearly to appreciate the reali-
ties, to appraise the difficulties, to balance the conflicting principles
of public policy, and to apply correctly the remedies that are within
its grasp.
Finally, the effort has been made to show that the ultimate
remedy for an intolerable situation lies not in the courts, under
existing law, not in the Interstate Commerce Commission, under
existing limitations, but rather in an enlightened public opinion
translated into sane and intelligent legislation. The price of indus-
trial advancement, at the expense of the conscripted neutral, may
be too great. Some forms of secondary boycott may have to be
banned.
7
While this paper has seemed to stress the secondary phases
growing out of a strike, rather than the primary labor disputes of
74. Campaign promises to repeai the Taft-Hartley law and the recent
elections do not compel change of the foregoing sentence. The President's
"State of the Union" message of January 6, 1947, recommended "Prevention
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the carrier with its own employees, the latter are not to be taken
as insignificant. Far from it, as witness the recent strike of tile
three Brotherhoods, the Locomotive Engineers, Firemen and Engi-
neers, and Switchmen's Union of America.
Judge Goldsborough in granting a permanent injunction on
July 1, 1948, said
"In face of the fact that the unions have had the benefit of the
Railway Labor Board, an impartial body, the Mediation Service, an
impartial body, the Board of Inquiry appointed by the President,
an impartial body, they sent out that notice, which meant that the
rail transportation system of the country, at six o'clock on a certain
morning, would simply stop.
"The undisputed evidence that 90 per cent of the mail could
not be handled and the undisputed evidence that 70 to 72 per cent
of the freight and passenger traffic could not be handled, simply
means that in a few weeks hunger would stalk the country, the
whole economic and political system would be upset, political ideolo-
gies which are opposed to the democratic ideology would have an
opportunity to engraft themselves here in this country, our in-
fluence throughout the world would be done away with and we
would become a laughing stock.
"The purpose of the Act, as I said before, was to give labor a
comparable bargaining power with capital, but to permit a strike
of this kind to take place is an extreme situation which society is
not required to tolerate under the Norris-La Guardia Act, and the
injunctive process is a proper one to pursue. See In re Debs, 158
U S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092. The Court wants to
emphasize that the Court is of the opinion that the United Mine
Workers case, 330 U S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884, is con-
trolling. The Court also wants to emphasize the Court's deliberate
opinion that the Norris-La Guardia Act does not control a situa-
tion where the entire transportation system of the country would
be stopped.
17
Notwithstanding the strength and courage breathed in the
foregoing opinion and decision, the theme of this paper is that the
nice balance of conflicting principles of public policy should, for
the ordinary and general run of cases, be weighed and determined
by the legislature, not by the courts.
of 'unjustifiable' secondary boycotts." Senator Morse (R.-Ore.), a liberal
and member of the Labor Committee is reported to have said that lie will
urge certain changes in the Wagner Act, among others "A ban on certain
secondary boycotts. " Arizona Daily Star, Dec. 17, 1948. "What the public
demands," he is reported as saying, "and is entitled to demand is fair labor
legislation which will check both employer and employee excesses, hut
which at the same time, will not destroy any legitimate right of either"
Charles J. MacGowan, an A. F of L. leader, is quoted as saying that where
stoppages by strikes threaten economic disaster government should have
power to interfere. New York Times, Nov. 12.
75. United States v Brotherhood of Loco. Engineers, 79 F Soln,
485 (D.C.D. Colo. 1948).
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